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 Foundation and Revolution 
 Hannah Arendt and the Problem 
of Legitimacy and Stability 
in Constitutional Consolidation 
 MEL A  TOPF 
 Th is chapter investigates the relations of revolutionary consolidation to the 
 American constitutional founding. Th e concepts of consolidation and augmenta-
tion have received little attention in relation to the central question of constitutional 
legitimacy. Hannah Arendt ’ s theory of revolution is paradigmatic in this respect. 
Notwithstanding her infl uential discussion of foundation, Arendt gives relatively 
little attention to the pragmatic role of consolidation in acts of constitutional 
founding. Further, scholarly analyses of Arendt on revolution rarely off er critiques 
of her concept of foundation in this respect. I focus on Arendt partly owing to 
her infl uential theories regarding founding of bodies politic and partly because 
I believe that within her political thought on what for her was the uniquely success-
ful consolidation of the American Revolution lies an explanation for that success 
that she herself does not expressly off er. Further, Arendt ’ s thinking may be a useful 
launchpad in considering the dynamics of founding moments. 
 Th e historical barriers to the successful consolidation of revolutionary acts 
are a function of negotiating the extraordinarily diffi  cult relation of revolution to 
legitimacy. Arendt ’ s theory of foundation refl ects the vexed relation of founding 
to legitimacy and to the order of stability.  ‘ Arendt is not considered as a thinker 
of order but as a thinker of  … revolutionary beginnings. ’ 1 I will look at the crea-
tion of the early US state constitutions (those developed 1776 to 1780) in order 
to argue that their purported legitimacy as foundational revolutionary acts was 
grounded in what Arendt calls the modern identifi cation of fabrication with 
action, with the consequent reliance on what she calls the  ‘ central  position of 
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the concept of process ’. 2 I will extend Arendt ’ s view of foundational acts to show 
that the consolidation phase of the American Revolution was widely perceived 
as guaranteeing the Revolution ’ s legitimacy by fabricating stable spaces for its 
augmentation, that is, institutions, which in turn are perceived as made through 
the force of speech acts  – written constitutions. Th e unprecedented reliance 
on the  ethos of fabrication was a crucial ground for the perceived legitimacy 
of the consolidation of the American Revolution. Everywhere the revolutionaries 
framed their narrative of events in terms of fabrication, a frame, for that era, of 
great cognitive power. 
 Th is was reinforced by the written and printed nature of the early constitutions, 
which was crucial to both the making and the consolidation of a constituent and 
stable post-revolutionary body politic. Th e emergence of a print culture  ‘ recon-
ceptualized the public sphere ’ (Gordon Wood) through what was in the 1770s the 
unprecedented making of constituting documents that had the force and eff ect of 
consolidation. Th e perceived stabilising force of the making of written constitut-
ing documents was crucial as  ‘ a foundation never more to be shaken ’, as one of 
the framers of the fi rst Pennsylvania Constitution put it. While Arendt, like many 
writers on revolution and founding, does not explicitly develop this important 
element at length, I will show that it is crucial to her views on the problem of the 
relation of revolution and founding on the one hand and to legitimacy, stability 
and consolidation on the other. 
 I. Hannah Arendt and the Problem 
of Revolutionary Consolidation 
 In her infl uential book  On Revolution , 3 Hannah Arendt largely avoids the ques-
tion of revolutionary consolidation in her treatment of the American Revolution. 
Somewhat curiously, she seems to adopt that revolution as a kind of norm, against 
which later revolutions in France, Russia and elsewhere failed, owing mainly to 
violence. She celebrates, with little attempt at explaining, the relatively non-violent 
character of the American Revolution. She simply notes, as she put it elsewhere, 
that the American revolutionaries  ‘ founded a completely new body politic without 
violence and with the help of a constitution ’. 4 She separates the act of foundation 
from development of a constitution, which, as she says, merely helped. 
 For Arendt, it is the foundation of a body politic, the  polis , which is crucial. 
Central to her thought is that human beings gain their humanity, their very iden-
tity as human, only to the extent that they are political. She was inspired by the 
ancient Greeks, for whom  ‘ outside the body politic man ’ s life was not only and 
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not even primarily insecure  … it was without meaning and dignity because under 
no circumstances could it leave any trace behind it ’. 5 It is only through action (as 
opposed to labour and work) that humans can be free, can exercise their unique 
capacity to initiate, to found, to begin something new. Hence,  ‘ the  raison d ’ etre of 
politics is freedom, and its fi eld of experience is action ’. 6 Action is never possible 
except in the  polis , in the presence of others in a public space:  ‘ to be isolated is to 
be deprived of the capacity to act ’. 7 Indeed,  ‘ without a space of appearance and 
without trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together, neither the 
reality of one ’ s self, of one ’ s own identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world 
can be established beyond doubt ’. 8 Th is space of appearance, of speech and action, 
where humans may come together has endurance and stability only because of the 
human capacity for fabrication. Fabrication is for Arendt a kind of second-order 
category of the  vita active , for it is by erecting a concrete world of lasting things 
that action can be protected and be remembered. 9 
 Working against action and fabrication, in danger of destroying them, is the 
endless cycle of nature, which must, as far as possible, be kept out of the  polis 
or at least be marginalised to protect action and fabrication. Humans of course 
never escape nature. Th ey may act and fabricate, but they also must engage in 
the third element of the human condition  – labour  – and they must consume 
the fruits of labour to survive, since we are always subject to the demands of 
biological necessity. Labouring and consuming are life processes, the most futile 
of human endeavours because they leave nothing behind. Labour is opposed to 
freedom, for labour  ‘ despite its futility is born of great urgency and motivated by 
a more powerful drive than anything else, because life itself depends upon it ’. 10 
For Arendt,  ‘ the activity corresponding to the status of poverty was laboring ’. 11 
Poverty, then, which  ‘ forces free men to act like a slave ’, 12 can have no place in the 
 polis owing to the threat it poses both to freedom and to the very stability of the 
public realm. 
 Arendt attributes the relative success of the American Revolution and  ‘ the fail-
ure of the men of the French Revolution ’ to  ‘ the predicament of poverty [that] was 
absent from the American scene but present everywhere else in the world ’. 13 Th e 
poor, even with some assurance of self-preservation, are bound by the necessity 
of labouring and consuming, so that even aft er  ‘ their self-preservation has been 
assured  … their lives are without consequence, and  … they remain excluded from 
the light of the public realm ’. 14 For Arendt, the French Revolution failed owing to 
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the intrusion of poverty  – of necessity  – into the public realm. Th ere the insidious 
pressures of compassion demanded not only that the people be liberated from 
tyranny, as in America, but that the poor  ‘ had to be liberated once more, and 
compared to this liberation from the yolk of necessity, the original liberation from 
tyranny must have looked like child ’ s play ’. 15 
 Arendt ’ s view of the success of the American Revolution has what one writer 
calls a curious unreality. 16 Arendt does note the role of institutional frameworks 
and constitutionalism, that is, what might be considered consolidation of the 
revolution, but, as another writer puts it, she is  ‘ not as concrete as one would 
like ’. 17 In  On Revolution ,  ‘ the American Revolution is rendered in deceptively 
pure tones  … We are presented with a sharp contrast between the violence of the 
French revolutionaries and the legal fairness of the Americans ’. 18 Arendt fails to 
connect the events of the American Revolution, and especially the concurrent 
and unprecedented state constitution-making, with its most surprising outcome, 
compared to the French and subsequent revolutions: the successful founding of 
stable and enduring constitutional structures. In short, she fails to account for 
the consolidation of the American Revolution. She never succeeds in explaining 
the surprising stability, and equally surprising universal perception of the legiti-
macy, of the revolutionary-era constitutions. Th e nature of the early constitutions 
and of the governments they created seems to be of little interest to Arendt. Th e 
 ‘ ever-recurring phenomenon of government remained to her a matter of so little 
urgency, if not indeed one of indiff erence, despite her relevant discussion of the 
separation of power principle  … the inherent goal of all political action remains 
oddly obscure. For that goal is decision ’. 19 
 Th e problem is twofold. First, Arendt ’ s concept of action foregrounds its 
unpredictable nature and celebrates the human capacity of beginning, witness 
and testimony to the human capacity for freedom.  ‘ It is the very nature of a 
beginning to carry with itself a measure of complete arbitrariness  … the begin-
ning has, as it were, nothing whatsoever to hold on to. ’ 20 A revolution for Arendt 
occurs only  ‘ when change occurs in a sense of a new beginning, where violence 
is used to constitute an altogether diff erent form of government, to bring about 
the formation of a new body politic ’. 21 Th is valorising of new beginnings, of 
 ‘ initiatory action with all of its inherent spontaneity, uncontrollability, and 
 unpredictability ’, 22 eff ectively prevents Arendt from coming to terms with the 
Foundation and Revolution 57
  23  Volk (n 1) 173. 
  24  Dick Howard,  ‘ Keeping the Republic: Reading Arendt ’ s  On Revolution aft er the Fall of the Berlin 
Wall ’ in Benhabib (n 1) 281. 
  25  Arendt (n 4) 140. 
  26  Jurgen  Habermas ,  ‘ Hannah Arendt ’ s Communications Concept of Power ’ ( 1977 )  44  Social 
Research   24 . 
  27  Jacques  Barzun ,  Darwin, Marx, and Wagner ,  2nd edn ( Doubleday ,  1958 )  165 . See also at 161: the 
 ‘ Marxian process is almost, but not quite, automatic ’. 
  28  Karl  Marx and  Friedrich  Engels ,  Communist Manifesto ( New York Labour News Co ,  1948 
[1848 ])  31 . 
mundane goals and the mechanics of their actual operation in the public realm. 
Hence, Arendt is  ‘ not considered a thinker of order but as a thinker of contin-
gency, of revolutionary beginning ’. 23 Another writer observes that Arendt  ‘ was 
far from being a constitutional engineer; she was far more concerned with the 
spiritual aspects of politics ’. 24 In other words, her interest is in founding and not 
in consolidation or augmentation. Other than the purported absence of poverty, 
Arendt never attempts to get to the basis for the American Revolution ’ s success in 
consolidating the revolution. 
 Arendt pays little attention to the question  – central to explaining the success 
of the American Revolution  – of how this new beginning was consolidated, and 
how it developed into a stable and legitimate constitutional system and so avoided 
the chaos, violence and instability of revolutionary governments in France. She 
notes in passing, and somewhat inconsistently, that America ’ s success can be 
attributed to  ‘ the relatively nonviolent character of the American Revolution ’, 
though she acknowledges only that the stability of the resulting political structures 
is  ‘ surprising ’. 25 Th e closest she comes, as Jurgen Habermas notes, is to place  ‘ more 
trust in the venerable fi gure of the contract than in her own concept of a praxis. 
She retreats  … into the contract theory of natural law ’. 26 
 Arendt, then, is a thinker of contingency, of revolutionary foundings. Consoli-
dation is simply not a central concern either in her thought on revolution, or for 
that matter in her thinking about human action and speech and their role in creat-
ing a political realm. In one sense, she does not diff er from many major writers 
on revolution. Th e Marxist analysis of revolution, which Arendt did not accept, 
has in common with her a lack of interest in consolidation, focusing instead on 
historical inevitability, so that human action and its capacity for founding play no 
role. In the Marxist view, consolidation warrants little if any attention because, as 
Jacques Barzun said, it is almost  ‘ automatic ’ :  ‘ Th e revolution over, Marx ’ s commu-
nist society gets itself established by sheer historic necessity. Communism comes 
without any special plan. ’ Th ere is  ‘ an as yet unknown and more cheerful message 
for the proletariat ’ on the revolution ’ s other side, but that will come about without 
human agency. 27 
 Marx acknowledges the violence necessary to revolution, speaking of the  ‘ point 
where war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of 
the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat ’. 28 Th e next step, 
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the dictatorship of the proletariat, continues the revolutionary violence: the prole-
tariat, now supreme, will  ‘ wrest  … all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all 
instruments of production in the hands of the state ’. Th e coercion and suppression 
of liberty are  ‘ of course ’ a requirement:  ‘ Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be 
eff ected except by means of despotic inroads into bourgeois rights. ’ 29 Aft erwards, 
the post-revolutionary state will famously wither away, apparently automatically, 
leaving what he calls  ‘ free development for all ’. 30 Lenin reveals the same pattern. 
Suppression, he writes, is  ‘ still necessary ’ during the transition from capitalism to 
communism, aft er which the new era will simply arrive. With the state ’ s wither-
ing away, the people will somehow  ‘ become accustomed to the observance of the 
elementary rules of social life that have been known for centuries ’, people observ-
ing these rules  ‘ without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without 
the  special apparatus for compulsion which is called the state ’. 31 
 II. Consolidation and the Problem of Legitimacy 
 Arendt, in addressing the American Revolution and its successful consolidation, 
cannot avoid the vexing question of how a revolution, which by its nature was 
illegitimate, resulted in a political system that was both stable and legitimate. For 
her, the  ‘ problem of founding the new body politic was eff ectively one of legiti-
macy [deriving]  … from the perplexities inherent in every beginning, whose 
 “ bewildering spontaneity ” means that no cause can be found to prove that the 
founding act of freedom was necessary and therefore justifi ed. Without such 
authority, a new legal constitution is at permanent risk of being undone, as was the 
French constitution, which was replaced fourteen times between 1789 and 1875 ’. 32 
 Th ere can be no consolidation without legitimacy. Arendt, fascinated by the 
American founders ’ revolutionary break with the past, never quite accounts for 
the legitimacy of the extraordinarily successful consolidation of the revolution 
through constitution-making. For her, Dick Howard writes, the  ‘ need to break 
with the past in order to found the new means that the new order has itself no 
proper legitimacy; its only foundation is the violent revolutionary  “ crime ” that 
destroyed the old order. Th is was the rock against which the French revolutionary 
hopes crashed again and again ’. 33 Th e disconnect between revolution and legiti-
macy  ‘ is precisely the dilemma of revolutionaries: how to establish a legitimate 
order when the existing order labels that act of establishment as fundamentally 
illegitimate ’. 34 
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 To confront this in her study of the American Revolution, Arendt relies not 
very convincingly on traditional social contract theory and argues for a continu-
ous line of legitimacy from the Mayfl ower Compact to the US Constitution. 35 For 
her, the Mayfl ower Compact is a social contract arising from a group of ship ’ s 
passengers thrown into a state of nature as their ship arrived at a vast wilderness. 
Arendt here tips into the view, commonly expressed during the revolutionary era, 
that independence put the colonies into a state of nature where they would remain 
until they developed constitutions. Arendt notes neither the then-common confu-
sion between forming a society and framing state governments nor the fact that 
the framers of the state constitutions never asserted this as a ground for the legiti-
macy of the new constitutions. 36 
 Yet, in revolutionary America, the entirely new and unprecedented 
constitution-making that began in 1776 was everywhere accepted as the legiti-
mate means of consolidating the revolution.  ‘ By 1776 the idea of a constitution  … 
had almost achieved the status of self-evident truth. Th at these new constitutions 
were formulated in writing evoked neither resistance nor amazement at such a 
novelty. ’ 37 Arendt appreciates this astonishing constitution-making, but she seems 
to presume that because the people had a revolutionary (but not yet a legal) right 
to do so, they had the ability to do so. She does not satisfactorily account, in these 
terms, for either the success of American constitutions in consolidating the revo-
lution or the failure of the French revolutionary constitutions to do so. Th e French 
accepted, as did the Americans, such notions as popular sovereignty, natural law 
and the social compact, but these failed to give legitimacy to the revolutionary 
governments in France, constitutional or not, none of which overcame the need 
for both the rhetoric and the acts of violence. 
 Th e unique success of the American Revolution and especially the absence 
of systemic violence (which so impressed Arendt)  ‘ cannot be fully explained by 
the theoretical insights ’ of the founders, who were  ‘ preoccupied by the absence 
of an absolute authority capable of legitimizing the legal foundations of the new 
republic ’. 38 Th is is where Arendt relies on her concept of foundation, the establish-
ment of a body politic comprising communities of free people.  ‘ It is this initial 
step which throughout Hannah Arendt ’ s thinking is so preeminent that political 
authority can, to her, be fl atly traced back to past religious sanction and legitima-
tion, back to the political act of founding and to its enduing presence. ’ 39 
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 Th e problem is that Arendt ’ s concepts, at least as applied to the American 
Revolution, seem, to use James Miller ’ s term, almost  ‘ magical ’. 40 True to her theory 
of action and foundation, but not true to the history of the American Revolution 
(Arendt ’ s treatment of which Miller somewhat harshly calls  ‘ shoddy ’ ), 41 Arendt 
marvels at how the American founders came together to found an enduring, 
stable and legitimate republic; that is, they uniquely consolidated a revolution. 
She assertively if vaguely attributes the broad acceptance of the new constitutions 
by the people to the  ‘ organizational impulses of the people themselves ’. 42 Here 
she seems to rely on her concept of spontaneous councils that she believed arise 
during revolutions. However, she pays little attention to any purported role they 
may have played in the American Revolution, where much of the activity occurred 
in duly elected and organised legislatures and conventions on the one hand, and 
in already-established and constituted town meetings on the other, and not in any 
spontaneously appearing councils. 
 Th e closest the Americans came to any such revolutionary councils were the 
committees of correspondence that the colonies established in 1773,  originally 
proposed by John Adams for Massachusetts but adopted everywhere. Th e commit-
tees were the colonies ’ fi rst form of governance that functioned independently of 
royal authority. Th e last royal governor of Massachusetts, Th omas Hutchinson, later 
lamented that independence began with the creation of these committees, calling 
them  ‘ a most glaring attempt to alter the constitution of the colonies  … It was an act 
which ought to have been considered as an avowal of  independency ’. 43 It is surpris-
ing, then, that Arendt nowhere mentions the committees of correspondence. 
 Arendt inadequately addresses the diffi  cult question of the consolidation of the 
revolution in America and does not account for the legitimation that consolida-
tion inevitably required in that, or in any, revolution. We must look at this question 
of legitimation. Yet, the concept of legitimacy has not been addressed with much 
success, being neither clearly defi ned nor related convincingly to political activity, 
nor much studied empirically. Some 40 years ago, two students of the subject said 
that  ‘ the nature and underpinnings of legitimacy are among the most neglected 
aspects of the dynamics of society ’, 44 and this has changed little since. Whatever 
the nature of legitimacy, it includes centrally the related elements of consent and 
perception. An act by those in power must be seen as having arisen from already-
established and consented-to communal norms. 45 
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 It was the early constitution-making of 1776 to 1780, all observers includ-
ing Arendt agree, that eff ectively consolidated the revolution and provided its 
 legitimacy and stability. But what was it about what Arendt calls  ‘ this spontaneous 
outbreak of constitution-making in all thirteen colonies  … so that there existed no 
gap, no hiatus, hardly a breathing spell between the war of liberation  … and the 
constitution of the new states ’ 46 that made these early written state constitutions 
so immediately and broadly perceived as legitimate ? While the unprecedented 
constitution-writing was spontaneous, the documents were framed on the author-
ity of the Continental Congress by formally elected representatives who, with the 
rejection of the monarchy, saw themselves as sovereign. Popular sovereignty was 
a necessary but by no means suffi  cient element of legitimacy, partly, as Gordon 
Wood and others have shown, because there was widespread disagreement in the 
revolutionary era as to what this meant in practice, ranging from mob rule to duly 
elected legislatures and conventions. 47 
 For Arendt,  ‘ the legitimacy of rule in general, and the authority of secular law 
and power in particular had [before the modern era] always been justifi ed by relat-
ing them to an absolute source not of this world ’. She acknowledges that  ‘ since it 
was the task of the revolutionaries to establish a new authority, unaided by custom 
and precedent and the halo of immemorial time, they could not but throw into 
relief with unparalleled sharpness the old problem  … of the source of law which 
would bestow legality upon positive, posited laws, and the origin of power which 
would bestow legitimacy upon the powers that be ’. 48 But if the  ‘ chief perplexity ’ of 
the revolutionaries  ‘ was where to fi nd an absolute from which to derive authority 
for law and power ’, 49 Arendt does not succeed, as I have tried to show, in demon-
strating what  ‘ absolute ’ the Americans found that would successfully consolidate 
their revolution through written constitutions. 
 While Arendt does not directly off er suffi  cient explanation, I believe that else-
where in her thought, she does provide the basis for elucidating the successful 
consolidation of the American Revolution. 
 III. Legitimacy and Fabrication 
 In 1776, the American revolutionaries were amazed by the opportunity inde-
pendence off ered to engage in what Gordon Wood describes as the provocative 
challenge that was somehow providentially directed at them. 50 Th ey were every-
where  ‘ thrilled at the prospect of forming their own government  … Few doubted 
the extraordinary, almost millennial, character of it all ’. 51 Th eir astonishingly fi rm 
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confi dence that they could, for the fi rst time, legitimately frame new govern-
ments  de novo  – and thereby consolidate the revolution  – through written 
constitutions is itself remarkable. Some observers remarked that the Continen-
tal Congress had trouble completing business because so many members went 
home to  participate in framing new state governments.  ‘ Constitutions employ 
every pen ’, wrote  Francis Lightfoot Lee in November 1776. 52 Th at this was the 
best way, if not the only way, to consolidate the revolution was with equal confi -
dence taken virtually for granted. 53 As soon as the possibility of independence 
began to be debated, writers seemed to accept with little or no contradiction 
that Americans could  ‘ erect more eligible systems of government on the ruins 
of the colonies ’ monarchial  constitutions ’. 54 William Gordon of Massachusetts, 
using the language of fabrication employed everywhere, declared:  ‘ Let Americans 
mold their  governments. ’ 55 John Adams exulted at  ‘ how few of the human race 
have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government, more 
than of air, soil, or climate for themselves or their children! ’ 56 James Burgh noted 
that all previous forms of government were the results of chance or force, but 
 Americans were  ‘ the fi rst people whom heaven has favoured with an opportunity 
of  … choosing the form of government under which they shall live ’. 57 
 It is these very frequent references to framing, forming, moulding, erecting 
and such that bring us back to Hannah Arendt. Th e earlier colonial charters and 
compacts were not perceived as  ‘ framing ’ completely new structures of govern-
ment on, so to speak, their own volition and self-referenced authority. While 
Arendt is much taken with the Mayfl ower Compact, her view of it as an instance 
where  ‘ a group of people could create a valid government for themselves by means 
of a covenant, compact, or constitution ’ 58 is not accurate. It sets aside a distinct, in 
fact unique, characteristic of the revolutionary era ’ s constitution-making: the revo-
lutionaries in America saw themselves as actually, quite literally, fabricating new 
governments. Th eir self-awareness in engaging in such a constitutional founding 
moment was itself unprecedented. In the Mayfl ower Compact, the group aboard 
ship vows to  ‘ combine our selues togeather into a ciuill body politick ’. 59 But while 
the Compact states the intention to frame a government, it does not itself do so, 
and at any rate acknowledges that any such framing derives from the authority of 
God and the king. 
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 Similarly, the colonial charters provided for structures of government, but 
they invariably and quite emphatically asserted royal authority for doing so. It was 
the king who did the framing  ‘ by our royal will and pleasure ’, the charter simply 
documenting and certifying it, and specifi cally delegating authority to the colonial 
leaders to carry it out. 60 Rhode Island ’ s Royal Charter of 1663 is entirely typical 
in this respect, declaring that King Charles II, who  ‘ by our will and pleasure  … 
and our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion  … have ordained, 
constituted and declared ’ that the petitioners  ‘ shall be  … a body corporate and 
politic ’. 61 Th e charter creates the offi  ces of governor and others, a judicial system 
and a legislative body, each with duties specifi ed, but these are created by  ‘ mere 
motion ’, by the grace and sheer will of the sovereign. 62 It is a rhetoric of will, not 
of fabrication. 
 Th e early American constitutions in contrast did not designate the frame 
of government as handed down from a higher authority. How was it that this 
notion of framing governments simply by the language of a written document 
was so widely and enthusiastically accepted as an objectively legitimate means of 
consolidating the revolution ? It was in part owing to writing and printing. By the 
eighteenth century, printing was widely perceived as affi  rming a document ’ s cred-
ibility, to some extent because the text could be relied upon as stable and enduring, 
and because of the relative ease and cheapness of promulgation. 63 Th is helped to 
confi rm the central and overriding purpose of constitutions:  ‘ written documents 
as barriers to encroaching power ’. 64 James Cannon of Pennsylvania anxiously 
asserted that in order to prevent constitutional rights from being  ‘ lost forever ’, they 
must be  ‘ written down in immutable documents ’. 65 Th is was a fl ashpoint in the 
debates between federalists and anti-federalists over whether the rights and princi-
ples of constitutions  ‘ actually have to be specifi ed and written down in order to be 
in force ’, refl ecting, Gordon Wood notes,  ‘ a basic ambiguity in the American mind 
about the nature of law that was carried into the Revolution ’. 66 But constitutions in 
their capacity as frames of government were everywhere understood as necessarily 
written, since they were meant to withstand anticipated challenges to the people ’ s 
liberties, when the documents would be invoked during inevitable disputes over 
interpretation and application. 
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 Th at the early American constitutions were written and printed does not, of 
course, itself account for the extraordinary confi dence the revolutionary era had 
in the legitimacy of, as it were, constructing governments on paper. Th at it was 
extraordinary, that there was nothing inherently automatic about written consti-
tutions as eff ective consolidators of revolutions, is evidenced by the revolution in 
France and that country ’ s repeated (and mostly failed) creation of constitutions  – 
some 14 in the 85 years aft er 1789. 
 Th e question remains: why were the early written constitutions so widely 
and enthusiastically accepted as the legitimate instruments to consolidate the 
 American Revolution ? While Hannah Arendt largely failed, as we have seen, to 
account for the consolidation phase of the American Revolution, I believe she 
does off er an explanation elsewhere in her work on the human condition, but 
not addressed in  On Revolution or her other discussions of revolution. We may 
fi nd it in Arendt ’ s concept of fabrication and its unique role in the public life of a 
 secular polity. 67 She argues that the powerful, unprecedented forces of seculari-
sation degraded the public realm to the point where we live in a condition of 
 ‘ worldlessness ’. We no longer have or believe in an enduring  polis that is a place 
for action and for the talking about and remembering actions. 68 We no longer 
accept that there are great words and deeds that stand out as singular events and 
disrupt the endless, futile cycles of daily life, words and deeds that make a world. 
In this worldless view of modern, mass society, all events are seen as merely parts 
of processes.  ‘ Th e modern concept of process  … separates the modern age from 
the past more profoundly than any other single idea. To our modern way of think-
ing nothing is meaningful in and by itself. ’ 69 
 Because in the modern era nature is the standard by which humans observe 
themselves, the study of nature  – natural science  – has become the foundation 
for all thought. It renders intellectual legitimacy to other systems of thought, 
and systems that do not pay allegiance to it are on the defensive and at risk of 
being marginalised. Th e power of modern science lies in its rejection of anything 
human. Th e trouble is, for Arendt, that without a public realm, humans can have 
no conception of an external reality:  ‘ Th e reality of the world is guaranteed by 
the presence of others. ’ 70 Th e weird consequence of this is that modern science 
accounts not for the external world, general opinion notwithstanding, but for 
a private one whose existence no one can be sure of. Such apparent discoveries 
as the motion of the earth, the law of inertia, the structure of the atom or the 
behaviour of matter at velocities approaching the speed of light, the great advances 
of modern science   – none of which can be revealed directly to the senses  – all 
presume a loss of faith in the truth-revealing capacity of the senses. Descartes ’ 
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doubt-based philosophy so wholly relied on Galileo ’ s work, especially regarding 
the heliocentric structure of the universe, that he feared that he would have to 
retract his system of thought if Galileo acknowledged (before the Inquisition) that 
he was wrong. If  ‘ the movement of the earth is false, all the foundations of my 
philosophy are also false ’. 71 
 Sensible reality itself is, Arendt argues, dissolved into the incoherent data of 
sense perception, so that humans are  ‘ ultimately imprisoned in a non-world of 
meaningless sensations that no reality and no truth can penetrate ’. 72 Th is world-
lessness of the subjective, the darkness of the private,  ‘ the playing of the mind with 
itself  ’, 73 is for Arendt the primary datum of the modern era.  ‘ Man, whenever he 
tries to learn about things which neither are himself nor owe their existence to 
him, will ultimately encounter nothing but himself, his own constructions, and 
the patterns of his own actions. ’ 74 Science itself appears to yield certainty where 
other knowledge seems so contingent only because  ‘ the sheer cognitive concern of 
consciousness with its own content  … must yield certainty, because here nothing 
is involved except what the mind has produced itself  ’. 75 
 An important consequence is that our own minds can construct whatever 
world we wish and accept it as reality.  ‘ We can take almost any hypothesis and 
 act upon it, with a sequence of results in reality which not only make sense but 
 work. Th is means quite literally that everything is possible not only in the realm 
of ideas but in the fi eld of reality itself. ’ 76 Th omas Hobbes (who like Descartes 
acknowledged his dependence on Galileo and Kepler) knew that understand-
ing  is   knowing how something is made:  ‘ Where is no generation  … there no 
 philosophy is perceived. ’ 77 For Hobbes, Ernst Cassirer writes, we  ‘ understand only 
what we can cause to develop under our observation  … If one wants to  “ know ” 
something, he must constitute it himself  ’. 78 Locke ’ s designation of knowing as an 
action, which he said was an original contribution to philosophy, 79 was grounded 
in the new conception of understanding as a positive process of  ‘ joining together ’. 80 
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 For Arendt, then, in a world where the decline of the  polis raises barriers to 
true action, we are left  with fabrication, so that we  ‘ substitute making for action in 
order to bestow on the realm of human aff airs the solidity inherent in work and 
fabrication ’. 81 Th ere is, Arendt notes, a line of thought extending back to Plato 
expressing uneasiness about the unpredictable and fragile nature of action as the 
central value of the political realm, so that the Western understanding of politi-
cal communities has always been menaced by the suspicion of action and by an 
accompanying desire to substitute fabrication for action. 82 Arendt argues that 
fabrication rose to become a predominant value in the modern era, evidenced by 
the crisis of secularisation and the scientifi c revolution it engendered. Arendt saw 
that the consequence, that  ‘ everything is possible ’, engendered the disasters of the 
twentieth century. Th ese included the totalitarian regimes, the embodiment of 
the  ‘ abyss of the possible ’, with the regimes ’ total domination and limitless capac-
ity for mass crimes, feasible in good part owing to normal people who simply 
do not believe the monstrosities of totalitarian systems, since they  ‘ don ’ t know 
that everything is possible ’. 83 
 However, Arendt does not take into account the prominent place of this new 
ethos of making in the Enlightenment ’ s striking self-assurance that it could, 
through sheer  “ rational reliance on the effi  cacy of energetic action ’, remake their 
world and diminish its many evils through the application of scientifi c method 
and its discoveries. Th is was  ‘ a genuine and far-reaching novelty in human 
aff airs ’. Now,  ‘ for the fi rst time in history, confi dence was the companion of real-
ism rather than a symptom of the Utopian imagination ’. 84 Th e widely perceived, 
rarely opposed, legitimacy of the early American constitutions meshed with the 
equally widespread belief that new governments can be made from scratch, so 
to speak, without posing any challenge to the legitimacy of these governments. 
Th e language of fabrication functioned as a legitimating rhetoric because fabrica-
tion was the primary frame, the cognitive model by which founding a new body 
politic was understood as both possible and legitimate. To paraphrase Hobbes, 
where there is no generation, there no legitimacy is perceived. For the people of 
revolutionary America, a written constitution meant  ‘ the active making of a new 
order, as opposed to its gradual emergence in the course of a continual historical 
development ’. Th is pointed directly to  ‘ the theoretical foundations of modernity 
which presume that the structure and values of the political order are neither 
innate nor revealed by God, but rationally fabricated by men ’. 85 To the extent that 
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violence, through the Revolutionary War, played a role, this is consistent with 
the nature of fabrication, which begins with acts of violence  – cutting down a 
tree, say, to make a chair  – though the violence is a means to that end, a means 
to consolidate order. For Arendt, the revolution in America was the exception, 
not showing  ‘ the same combination of the old Roman enthusiasm for the foun-
dation of a new body politic with the glorifi cation of violence as the only means 
of  “ making ” it ’. 86 
 Th e American Revolution ’ s relative absence of violence and the contribution of 
that absence to the Revolution ’ s consolidation, which so impressed Arendt, have 
been accounted for by historians pointing to what they believe was the evolutionary 
nature of events in America. John Phillip Reid, for example, writes that America ’ s 
constitutional arguments against Britain were consistently based on principles 
already established and  ‘ familiar ’ because American constitutional claims were 
all derived from former and current British constitutions, or the British imperial 
constitution. 87 Others have similarly seen the early revolutionary constitutions as 
actually a re-forming, out of already-constituted town governments in already-
constituted colonies. 88 
 But this sudden  ‘ obsession with constitution making at the inception of the 
American Revolution ’ 89 cannot be adequately explained by seeking continuities 
with the past. Such continuities fail to account for the consolidation of the revolu-
tion, that is, for the role of the early constitutions in affi  rming the newly framed 
governments ’ legitimacy and, owing to their legitimacy, their stability. It was the 
acts of fabricating that were crucial in this respect. Although Arendt does not 
make the explicit connection, for her, as Jeremy Waldron puts it,  ‘ that politics 
need  housing , and that building such housing can be equated with the framing of a 
 constitution  – this is an image that recurs throughout Arendt ’ s writings ’. Whatever 
images she uses  – furniture, fences and boundary walls, bricks and mortar   – 
 ‘ always the emphasis is on artifi cial structures  … which exist as features of a world 
that men have made for themselves ’. 90 
 Arendt is not consistent in terms of whether she sees constitution-making 
as fabricating or as acting. 91 But fabricating is more central to her political 
thought than observers oft en note, with their greater interest in her concept of 
action itself, of her (literally) dramatic  ‘ agonistic conception of politics  – politics 
as a stage for action and distinction ’, as well as in her yearning for the ancient 
 polis. 92 Th is is owing largely to her neglect, already discussed here, in failing to 
explain just how the early constitution-making succeeded in consolidating the 
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American Revolution, in framing stable governments with enduring institutions 
whose legitimacy was not subject to challenge, while many later revolutions  – for 
Arendt all of them  – were complete, oft en disastrous, failures in just this consoli-
dation. One element of the early constitutions to which she pays little attention 
is that the frames of government in these constitutions all comprised specifi cally 
and carefully defi ned institutions. Habermas makes the connection:  ‘ Owing to 
its innovative potential, the domain of praxis is highly unstable and in need of 
protection. In societies organized around a state, this is looked aft er by political 
institutions. ’ 93 Yet, Arendt acknowledges that rights could be protected only by 
such institutions and also acknowledges that these institutions were designed so 
that their powers could be checked and balanced, chiefl y through the separation 
of powers. 94 
 Institutions are the crucial element in the consolidation of a revolution, and 
they, not assertions of rights, are what are unprecedented in early American 
constitution-making. Th e futility of declaring rights in  ‘ theatrical proclamations ’ 
(Waldron ’ s phrase) was the basis of Arendt ’ s criticism of the ineffi  cacy of the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and later such proclama-
tions. But  ‘ the moment human beings  … had to fall back on their minimum right, 
no authority was left  to protect them and no institution was willing to guaran-
tee them ’. 95 Rights  ‘ need to be built into the civic structures ’. 96 Rights themselves 
were widely understood, and argued, as having always existed, whether or not 
enumerated in a constitution. Constitutions emphatically were not seen as in and 
by themselves creating rights  ex nihilo . Revolutionary-era Americans understood 
their constitutions framing institutions that protected these rights and, perhaps 
more important for Arendt, creating an enduring civic realm without which rights 
would be meaningless abstractions. Indeed, the early constitutions were what 
Preuss calls institutionalist:  ‘ Institutionalist constitutions  … institutionalize the 
capacity of the people to form and enforce their will in post-revolutionary times. ’ 97 
Once again, Arendt remains above dealing with the nuts and bolts of constitu-
tionally established institutions and their role in revolutionary consolidation, her 
world of abstractions, as one critic put it,  ‘ largely uncontaminated by mundane 
things ’. Nonetheless, she is engaged, if indirectly,  ‘ with quite familiar issues about 
institutions, and  … how important structure is, even in her most abstract charac-
terizations of human freedom ’. 98 
 Th e constitution-making and its institution-building, the acts of foundation 
that so interested Arendt, could not have contributed so centrally to consolidating 
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the American Revolution unless they were perceived as legitimate. Th eir legiti-
macy rose from the perception of them as fabricated and so not handed down by 
some external, higher and transmundane authority, whether divine or royal or 
tradition. It was in this sense that the revolutionaries so oft en thought of them-
selves as being in a state of nature. Th e people of Massachusetts, for example, 
during the development of their fi rst constitution,  ‘ imagined themselves creating 
government for the fi rst time, as if revolution had cast them back into a state of 
nature wherein they would reestablish government ’. 99 Arendt does not explain this 
in terms of her concept of fabrication since she falls back on  ‘ the venerable fi gure 
of the contract ’ and the contract theory of natural law. 100 Jurgen Habermas, in 
criticising her for this approach, argues that Arendt is defi cient in failing to test 
her concepts of speech and action (what he insightfully calls her  ‘ anthropology 
of communicative action ’ ). 101 Th is is, perhaps, because she is not quite willing to 
proff er a relation between action and fabrication, which, on the one hand, she sees 
as fundamentally exclusive principles of the human condition and, on the other, 
argues that making can substitute for action  ‘ in order to bestow upon the realm 
of human aff airs the solidity inherent in work and fabrication ’. 102 Mainly, though, 
Arendt sticks to the sharp distinction between action and fabrication, probably in 
order to avoid diluting her dramatic, agonistic and character-revealing notion of 
action by having to acknowledge that action can be a mere means to an end, lead-
ing to  ‘ something ’, and so be conducive to fabrication. 
 My argument here is that the American revolutionaries, in the face of a poten-
tial crisis of legitimacy inherent in any attempt to consolidate a revolution, adopted 
an unprecedented mode of action that was indeed an act of fabrication. By this act, 
they could legitimately found a constitutional order, a body politic whose institu-
tions would in turn be perceived, acknowledged and accepted as legitimate, and 
thereby stable and enduring, and so comprise a consolidation of their revolution. 
More specifi cally, the outcomes of the legislatures and conventions that developed 
the early constitutions were speech acts, and what those speech acts fabricated 
were constitutional orders.  ‘ What is crucial in their [the founders ’ ] act of founding 
is linguistic. In J.L. Austin ’ s terms, they used language that might appear denota-
tive  … but is actually performative. ’ 103 What allowed the founders ’  ‘ performative 
language ’ to succeed ?  ‘ How can we explain its being taken up by the populace as 
constituting an adequate foundation for a new body politic ? ’ 104 Arendt explains 
only that the American revolutionaries, in what she believed is the only success-
ful attempt at doing so,  ‘ founded a completely new body politic without violence 
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and with the help of a constitution ’. 105 She seems to view a constitution as some-
what marginal, a mere device, which provided  ‘ help ’. In fact, constitutions were, 
and remained, the core of the body politic and of the legitimacy of the American 
 Revolution ’ s consolidation. It is this that needs explanation. 
 Th e legitimacy of the constitution-making arose in great part out of the role 
that fabrication played in modern secular thinking. However, we need to look 
at how this legitimacy, which is always a function of appearances, was commu-
nicated, applying what Habermas calls Arendt ’ s  ‘ communicative praxis ’. Th e 
problem is that a revolution, which by its nature is illegitimate, is burdened with 
communicating the legitimacy of any attempted consolidation. Surprisingly little 
attention has been given to the communication of legitimacy. Studies of legiti-
macy tend pretty consistently towards exposing social and economic forces that 
lie behind claims to legitimacy, especially to show that legal and political institu-
tions  ‘ adopt rules which serve the dominant interest groups in society ’. 106 Th is 
view downgrades legitimacy to window-dressing to cover up the exercise of  ‘ real ’ 
power. 
 Speech acts and fabrication, that is, a message and its context, aff ect each other 
dynamically and actually help create each other. Th e basic principle of linguistic 
pragmatics, that a sign has meaning only within context, is of course true. But 
equally true is that context  – the world  ‘ out there ’  – has meaning only in relation to 
the sign. Th is rejects the older positivist notion that words and sentences somehow 
contain meaning, what Gerald Graff  calls  ‘ the fallacy of semantic immanence ’. 107 
Th e constructivist view of the dynamics of language rightly asserts that  ‘ to speak, 
to interact with others verbally, is thus to construct the world, to constitute it, not 
merely to mirror it in words ’. 
 If communication were simply some objective event within an objective world 
of context, then communication could be observed against a static background 
of world/context. However, there exists no Newtonian fi xed point in an abso-
lute space of context from which a message may be observed and studied as it 
moves through contextual space. Moreover, the context, the space through which 
the message takes eff ect, is relative to the message. Th ere is no communication 
without perception of the context, but there is no perceiving context without 
communication. Neither the message alone nor the context alone has reality; only 
the message-context continuum does. In other words, there exists no objective 
message or objective context, but there exists an objective relation between the 
two. Th is is communication. A message cannot exist outside its context. Th ere is 
no outside for it to exist in. 
 Th is throws some light on the operation of Arendt ’ s communicative praxis 
and its place in the consolidation of the American Revolution. Th at we have some 
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confi dence that our utterances can be communicated is wholly owing to our 
common presence in a space of shared values and ends. It is the essence of space, 
as Merleau-Ponty said, to be already constituted, 108 and we communicate with 
others in terms of our and their place within the already-constituted spaces of 
institutions. In other words, the spaces in which we share our presence with others 
are pre-eminently institutional. Conversely, the institutional contexts are reifi ed 
by speech. Communication supports the  ‘ selective maintenance of relatively stable 
strictures of images and associations that stem from institutional structures and 
policies ’. 109  ‘ Our capacity for communication depends on mutual acceptance of a 
complex of conventions whose visibility and continuity are guaranteed institution-
ally. Utterances become speech acts only when they are put forth in the presence 
of others. ’ 110 We communicate with others in terms of our and their places within 
the space of institutions. 
 Action, then, and specifi cally speech acts (for this is what the constitutional 
conventions put forth) did fabricate the legitimate institutions that consolidated 
the American Revolution. Th e self-assurance with which the Americans of the 
revolutionary era enthusiastically engaged in constitution-making was grounded 
in the modern ethos of making not only as a means of understanding reality, but 
as a means of acting to consciously make a new reality both legitimate and stable 
by virtue of speech acts  – the constitution-making itself  – and without the need for 
reference to divine or royal or traditional authority to secure legitimacy. It never 
happened before. 

